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Abstract 
In recent decades the people of Haiti have 
faced ecological disaster, political up- 
heaval, and persis tent economic hard- 
ship. These aflictions have motivated 
hundreds of thousands of Haitians to 
migrate to other Caribbean countries, 
the United States and Canada. While 
many observers know that mass migra- 
tion was the result of Haiti's problems, it 
was themass migration from rural high- 
lands to urban slums that created the 
important preconditions for the violent 
expression of collective grievances. 
Since the 1950s, certain development 
projects in the highlands have displaced 
large numbers of Haitians by causing or 
exacerbating the severe environmental 
degradation that destroyed their land, 
water and fuelwood resources. Specifi- 
cally discussed are the Piligre Dam and 
the use of Green-Revolution technology. 
The result was that squatter settlements 
at the edge of Port-au-Prince and the 
district capitals grew crowded, volatile 
and violent. 
Duns les derni2res dbcennies la popula- 
tion d'Hazti a it6 confrontie h des disas- 
tres icologiques, des bouleversements 
politiques et u n  marasme iconomique 
persistant. Ces avatars ont amene' des 
centaines de milliers d'haztiens h h i -  
grer vers d'autres pays des Carai'bes, 
vers le Canada ou vers les t t a t s - h i s .  Si 
de nombreux obset-uateurs sont bien 
conscients que cette h igrat ion massive 
a iti le principal risultat des p r o b l h s  
d'Haiti, il y a aussi lieu de s'aviser du fait 
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Philip Howard 
que c'est la massive migration interne 
depuis les rigions montagneuses des 
campagnes vers les bidonvilles urbains 
quiest h l'originedes importantes condi- 
tions d'engendrement de l'expression de 
la co1k.e collective. Depuis les annies 
1950, u n  certain nombre de projets de 
diveloppement duns la zone monta- 
g m s e  on t en train6 2e dkplacement d'un 
grand nombre d'haztiens, en engendran t 
ou amplijiant la s h h e  dgradation 
environnementale menant h la destruc- 
tion des terres, des points d'eau et des 
ressources en bois combustible. On dis- 
cute ici spe'cijiquement le cus du barrage 
Piligre impliquan t notammetit 2'utilisa- 
tion de technologies relevant de la "U- 
volution Verte". Le risultat patent en a 
it6 que les communautis d'occupants 
illdgaux de la ptriphirie de Port-au- 
Princeet des capitales &districts ont vu 
nettement augmenter leur nombre, leur 
instabiliti et leur niveau de violence. 
Introduction 
Haiti is the most impoverished and 
environmentally degraded country in 
the western hemisphere. Although 
most developing countries experience 
rapid urbanization in some form, dis- 
trict capitals in Haiti have grown at 
unusually rapid rates in the past few 
decades. The capital of Haiti, Port-au- 
Prince, has grown at a faster rate than 
most of the world's larger megacities, 
straining local infrastructure and 
forming the political cauldron from 
which civil strife has boiled up. Civil 
strife and economic malaise in Haiti 
have often resulted in the migration of 
large numbers to the shores of Florida 
and the cane fields of the Dominican 
Republic and other Caribbean coun- 
tries. However, mass migration from 
rural to urban areas over several dec- 
ades created the initial conditions for 
civil strife: densely populated slums 
where solidarity between people with 
common health, economic and politi- 
cal grievances could build. 
Haiti's tumultuous history is the 
background for its current predica- 
ment, because at no time since the 
revolution of 1804 have elites provided 
education or new sources of income to 
the large majority of Haitians from 
whom wealth was extracted (Mintz 
1995). This context of endemic poverty 
is important for understanding recent 
turmoil, and observers are correct to 
look into class, corruption, and vodoun 
culture that are the most apparent fac- 
ets of Haiti's political culture. How- 
ever, mob violence in the streets of 
Port-au-Prince and other major urban 
centres has disrupted national politics 
more than protest in rural communi- 
ties, and it is important to understand 
how and why these urban slums 
formed. Even though some analysts 
have also sought to associate rapid 
population growth and urban poverty 
with civil strife in Haiti, they often stop 
short of tracing popular grievances 
back to an important source-migra- 
tion induced by the environmental con- 
sequences of development projects. 
The urban population of Haiti has 
grown phenomenally in the last few 
decades. Natural growth rates in cities 
are often lower than in rural areas, and 
the population boom of cities like Port- 
au-Prince, Cap Haitian and Jacmel is 
largely the result of heavy migration 
from farming communities in the high- 
lands. Some of this migration is due to 
general economic malaise and politi- 
cal strife that has long afflicted many 
highland communities. However, 
both large industrial development 
projects and smaller Green Revolution 
development projects induced a sig- 
nificant portion of the migration into 
Haiti's urban centres. The economic 
opportunities createdby these projects 
were temporary, and they were cre- 
ated at the expense of the ecological 
resources used by the vast majority of 
the population in subsistence and 
small-scale agriculture. 
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There is no nationwide empirical 
evidence with which to compare mi- 
gration numbers from communities 
targeted for development with migra- 
tion numbers from communities left to 
their own devices. However, the anec- 
dotal and empirical evidence from spe- 
cific development projects in Haiti is 
strong. Development-induced migra- 
tion occurred at different rates in Haiti: 
projects that radically disrupted local 
ecology sent people to the cities or 
neighbouring regions at a rapid pace; 
projects that gradually degraded local 
ecology induced a slower pace of mi- 
gration. This paper will review exam- 
ples of each kind of development- 
induced migration. First, the social and 
ecological impact of the large PCligre 
hydroelectric and irrigation system in 
the Artibonite District will be ex- 
plored. Second, a series of smaller 
highland development projects will be 
studied with the aim of identifying the 
inappropriate assumptions common 
to many such projects. 
Development in Haiti 
Economic and Political Context 
of Development in Haiti 
Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier in- 
herited his father's title of "President 
For Life" in 1971 and led the country 
through several years of economic 
prosperity. However, the economic 
growth was unsustainable largely be- 
cause of the new President's corrupt 
and lacklustre leadership. His regime 
violently suppressed political opposi- 
tion, but after 15 years of economic and 
social stagnation protests and riots 
rocked the country's capital, Port-au- 
Prince. On February 7, 1986, Jean- 
Claude Duvalier fled Haiti for France 
(Abbott 1988). 
In the following decade civil disor- 
der constantly erupted on the political 
landscape of the country, and Haiti 
undertook a perilous path to democ- 
racy. Protests throughout the country 
frequently expressed dissatisfaction 
with government leadership, but vio- 
lence in the capital's slums has been 
the most pernicious threat to state se- 
curity. Although these slums remain 
an important part of Aristide's power 
base, they remain impoverished, over- 
crowded, and volatile communities. 
Development projects are designed 
to foster development, but they can 
have unintended effects on rural com- 
munities and ecosystems. Land in 
Haiti hasbeen stressed by overproduc- 
tion and erosion in the past, but several 
development projects in rural Haiti 
have significantly degraded large 
parts of the countryside, displacing 
many families. 
The Haitian state has long been run 
by a small number of powerful fami- 
lies, and this "educated urban and 
largely mulatto elite used the state to 
enrich itself by any means possible. Its 
members paid little or no taxes or cus- 
toms duties, or even their utility bills" 
(Maingot 1995, 60). One observer 
called Jean-Claude Duvalier's regime 
a "keptocratic state" that sought to 
nationalize the economy so that cor- 
ruption in the private sector could in- 
teract symbiotically with corruption in 
the public sector (Maingot 1995, 61). 
Since large sums were skimmed off 
public works projects many were ill- 
fated from the beginning, and few of 
the revenues generated from import 
duties have ever been put to rural de- 
velopment. 
Most development projects spon- 
sored by foreign agencies, by contrast, 
remained under close scrutiny by the 
donor community and were a rela- 
tively minor source of revenue for lo- 
cal elites. Still, projects had to work 
around the local elites that manipulate 
policies, programs and property rights 
in their favour. Rural populations in 
Haiti are managed by the administra- 
tive chefi de section, large land owners, 
and people who organize local ex- 
ports, the spekulate. 
Population Growth and 
Urbanization 
Between 1965 and 1995 the total popu- 
lation of Haiti grew from 4.2 million to 
7.2 million despite extremely high 
Figure 1: Population Growth and Urbanization in Haiti, 1950-2010 
(millions of people) 
Urban 
Sources: World Resowces Institute, World Resources 1994-95 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994), 286; World Bank, Social and Economic Indicators 'Stars' Data Set. 
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rates of infant mortality and extremely 
low life expectancy. In contrast to the 
annual growth rate of 1.8 percent for 
the total population, the urban popu- 
lation grew by about 3.6 percent each 
year, and today one third of the popu- 
lation lives in burgeoning urban cen- 
tres. Figure 1 details both rapid growth 
in the number of people living in Haiti 
and rapid growth in the proportion of 
Haitians living in urban areas. The 
state capital of Port-au-Prince has 
grown more than tenfold since 1950, 
and is now home to at least 2 million 
people.' 
Even though the rate of growth in 
urban populations is high, about two 
thirds of the total population still live 
in rural areas. Some experts estimate 
that it takes one hectare of good land to 
feed two people for a year. Overall, 
rapid population growth in Haiti has 
resulted in the highest population den- 
sity in the Americas-2.5 people per 
hectare. However, the quality of the 
land in many places deteriorated over 
this period. 
Whereas environmental degrada- 
tion induced people to leave rural ar- 
eas, the hope of economic prosperity 
enticed people to come to the cities. In 
the mid-1970s almost half the urban 
population had access to piped drink- 
ing waters while only 3 percent the 
rural population had the same privi- 
leges. Even after the economic em- 
bargo, industry in Port-au-Prince 
employed less than 6 percent of the 
population yet accounted for 15 per- 
cent of the nation's GDP and garnered 
most of the state's meagre public ex- 
penditure (Bryan 1995,68). 
A Sensitive Ecology 
Haiti is a mountainous Caribbean 
country of less than 2.8 million hec- 
tares. Almost two-thirds of the coun- 
tryside has a slope of more than 20 
percent, and two-fifths of the land is 
above 400 meters in elevation, making 
the soil particularly susceptible to ero- 
sion by torrential storms that pummel 
the land from June to October. Experts 
estimate that only one-third of the land 
is actually cultivable by conventional 
standards, though over one-half of the 
land is now put to some form of agri- 
cultural production (White and 
Jickling 1995,s). Although the country 
is semiarid and protected against 
moist trade winds by the Dominican 
Republic, its soils are like those of other 
tropical islands-fertile but thin. 
Rapid deforestation and intense farm- 
ing in several regions exposed the soil 
to the energy of wind and rain, which 
over a few decades carried away the 
livelihood of many rural families. 
The Artibonite District and The 
Pe'ligre Dam 
Between the two coastal towns of 
Gonaives and Saint-Marc is a large 
plain of rich, fertile soil called the 
Artibonite District. A system of rivers 
flow from Lake Peligre in the central 
highlands of Haiti, nurturing the soils 
of one of Haiti's most agriculturally 
productive areas. Several decades ago 
the Artibonite District also developed 
the country's most complex irrigation 
system, a project that temporarily en- 
hanced local agricultural production 
and eventually displaced large num- 
bers of people. 
While the construction of a hydro- 
electric and irrigation facility in- 
creased the production of some crops 
in the valleys downstream, the valleys 
upstream were heavily logged and 
subsequently eroded. Declining agri- 
cultural production upstream forced 
many people to migrate to the low- 
lands or urban centres. Since competi- 
tion for land grew fierce in the 
Artibonite, an increasing number of 
families either moved into urban 
slums or chose to resolve disputes with 
machine guns purchased from the 
army. 
Until 1949 the Artibonite was 
farmed by small producers and the 
land was of little agricultural value. 
That year, however, the government 
began to plan for a new hydroelectric 
and irrigation facility, about 100 kilo- 
meters upland from the mouth of the 
Artibonite River. With a US$4O million 
loan from the American government, 
the Artibonite Valley Development 
Organization (AVDO) planned a hy- 
droelectric facility to provide power 
for Port-au-Prince to the southeast and 
irrigate the Artibonite valley to the 
northeast. Social elites were the first to 
hear of the project, and they began to 
buy up tracts of land for about one US 
, 
dollar per hectare. Knowing that new 
areas of land were going to become 
productive, wealthy elites arranged 
for property rights to lands that were 
either unclaimed or occupied by peas- 
ants without clear titles. 
The government organized a land 
registry program two years after mak- 
ing the decision to develop the 
Artibonite Valley. Using aerial pho- 
tography engineers determined that 
32,000 hectares of 45,000 hectares 
would benefit from the project, and 
that the average farm size was around 
1.2 hectares. However, the average 
farm size was probably much lower- 
little over 1 hectare per farm. More- 
over, the land survey did not track the 
number of people living off each par- 
cel of land. In Haiti land property is 
traditionally divided in equal portions 
between heirs, and by underestimat- 
ing the population density planners 
could not anticipate the demand for 
irrigati~n.~ 
Under the direction of 'the AVDO 
the Dam was completed and Lake 
Peligre created in 1956. Wherever irri- 
gation facilities expanded in the next 
few decades, absentee landowners 
managed much of the agriculture on 
the newly productive land through 
rent and repression. 
By 1963 much of the loan to the 
AVDO had been spent and the land 
registration left incomplete. Moreover, 
the United States suspended all eco- 
nomic and military assistance to Haiti 
because of the corruption and repres- 
sive regime of "Papa Doc" Duvalier. 
The rapid modernization of agricul- 
ture in the valley had sigruficantly in- 
creased the area of rice cultivation and 
the volume of rice produced without 
creating the indigenous skills to main- 
tain the irrigation system. Lacking the 
support of fertilizers and attention of 
engineers, the infrastructure deterio- 
rated, accelerating the salinization of 
the soils. The AVDO reopened in 1971, 
but it was not until five years later that 
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a loan from the InterAmerican Devel- 
opment Bank allowed the irrigation 
system to be rehabilitated. 
Haiti's production of rice increased 
sigruficantly after the construction of 
the P6ligre Dam, largely because of the 
expanding irrigation of the Artibonite 
District. By the late 1970s the 
Artibonite Valley region produced 80 
percent of Haiti's rice across 32,000 
hectares, and had 2 large state mills 
and over 200 smaller mills to collect 
and clean domestic, American and Tai- 
wanese varieties of rice. 
At the time, the government esti- 
mated that 20 percent of the land was 
worked by renters, 20 percent was 
worked by sharecroppers, and 60 per- 
cent of the land was worked by owner/ 
occupants (Perez and Bona l983,9-10). 
However, these figures belie the com- 
plex reciprocal relationships that de- 
velop between neighbours in Haitian 
farming communities. Most families 
own some small plots and alterna- 
tively hired labour or served as labour 
when necessary. Because a minority of 
landlords owned larger plots of better 
quality, small producers increasingly 
hired themselves out to supplement 
the income from their less productive 
land. The scarcity of land resources in 
rural communities rose rapidly: at the 
outset of the decade 70 percent of the 
farmers had plots of less than 1.3 hec- 
tares; by the end of the decade 85 per- 
cent of the farmers had plots of less 
than 1.3 hectares (Durand 1983,19). 
The land registration process in the 
Artibonite did not begin again until 
1978, fifteen years after it had stalled. 
Complete reports started coming back 
in 1981, revealing astounding popula- 
tion growth since the early surveys. 
Laborers had been brought in by ab- 
sentee landlords, families from neigh- 
bowing regions migrated in search of 
new opportunities, and high fertility 
rates in many communities resulted in 
the constant subdivision of small plots 
between heirs. One study of 16 com- 
munities in 1951 found that property 
sizes ranged between 0.65 and 1.27 
hectares, with the average plot meas- 
uring about 0.96 hectares. Thnty years 
later, property sizes in the same com- 
munities ranged between 0.22 and 0.56 
hectares, with the average plot meas- 
uring only 0.85 hectares (Zamor 1983, 
=I). 
One sigruficant reason for the rising 
number of people in the valleys below 
the Peligre Dam was the utter decirna- 
tion of agriculture in the central pla- 
teau above the dam. The most serious 
consequence of the Peligre was the log- 
ging that followed. Tropical forests in 
the highlands of Haiti had been inac- 
cessible to logging interests until a net- 
work of good roads were built to 
service the dam. Consequently, the 
river basins above the dam were rap- 
idly deforested, degrading the rivers 
and watersheds, and exposing a sig- 
nificant amount of topsoil to erosion. 
In turn, most of the eroded soil quickly 
collected at the bottom of the Peligre 
reservoir. 
The dam had a formidable impact 
on land use patterns in the Artibonite. 
Table 1 reveals a radical change in land 
use along the Samana and Thomondes 
Rivers that feed into the Peligre reser- 
voir. Both are representative of the ef- 
fects of the Peligre development on 
upstream rivers. While the reservoir 
flooded three thousand hectares of 
land along the shore of the Artibonite, 
local farmers also cleared land to feed 
vowing comunities in the plateau. 
Given that the population density of 
the entire region was estimated at one 
person per hectare in 1956, about 
34,300 people were living in these two 
basins at the time. Assuming that the 
birth rate in these two basins was sirni- 
lar to that of other rural areas, the 
population of these two basins would 
have been between 42,700 and 49,500 
in 1978. Using the conservative meas- 
ure of the region's population, the 
changing resource base for communi- 
ties in the Samana and Thomondes 
basins can be estimated. 
Forests supply fuel, food and build- 
ing supplies, and in 1956 there were 
roughly five people for every hectare 
of forest in the region. Twenty years 
later there werefifeen people living off 
every hectare of forest in the region. 
The addition of more land for agricul- 
tural production was offset by the ris- 
ing number of people and severe 
erosion. On average there were 3.8 
people living off each cultivated hec- 
tare in 1956, yet twenty years later 
there were 4.5 people living off each 
cultivated hectare. Restricted water 
flow also created a health hazard for 
Table 1: Land Use and Resource Scarcity above the P6ligre Dam, 
1956 and 1978 
Samana Thomondes Regional Population per 
L a d  Use Sub-Basin Sub-Basin Average ResaufieBaae 
Forest Woodland 4,030 700 3,200 2,140 21 8 4.7 15.0 
Agriculture 2,570 3,600 6,400 5,730 26 27 3.8 4.5 
Area Denuded, 
Eroded or Rocky 5,200 7,500 12,900 14,630 53 65 1.8 1.9 
Total 11,800 22,500 100 1.0 1.2 
Sources: M .  Frenette et al., "Cas Historique de Sedimentation du Barrage Peligre, Haiti," Cam- 
dianJounra1 @ i d  Engineering, Vol. 9 (1982): 210; World Resources Institute, World Resources 
1994-95 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 286; World Bank, Social and Economic 
Indicators 'Stars' Dataset. 
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communities by turning the water 
brackish. 
Acute shortages of land, fuelwood 
and fresh water resources began to dis- 
place people from the region above the 
dam in the late 1970s. Some moved to 
Port-au-Prince and other urban centres 
in search of work; some moved down- 
stream in search of work or land to 
rent; others moved across the border 
into the Dominican Republic either 
permanently or in search of seasonal 
labour (Orenstein 1995). The decade of 
the 1970s saw a siphcant change in 
land distribution in the valley below, 
due in part to the influx of migrants. 
Although the state expanded irriga- 
tion facilities in the Artibonite and 
made the region the leading producer 
of rice, a majority of properties down- 
stream were suffering from chronic 
drainage and salinity problems by the 
mid-1980s. Agriculture was still more 
productive in the valley than in many 
places upland, and a large number of 
displaced people came in search of 
work or small plots of land to buy, rent 
or occupy. When possible, the AVDO 
subsidized fertilizers and repairs to the 
irrigation system, but dwindling state 
resources in the late eighties made 
comprehensive agricultural develop- 
ment difficult. 
The Pkligre Dam has become a text- 
book example of the importance of 
environmental impact assessments to 
sensible development planning. Origi- 
nal designs for the dam were informed 
by sedimentation studies done in 1925, 
and project engineers estimated that 
the dam would have an effective life of 
180 years at a sedimentation rate of 
3.45~106 m3 each year. However, after 
23 years the average silting was three 
times of the design estimates- 
9.60~106 m3 each year had collected in 
the reservoir behind the dam. Defor- 
estation and rapid population growth 
had radically altered the vegetative 
cover of many slopes, and the erosion 
altered water courses, expanded river 
banks, and resulted in gullying, mud 
slides and increased flocculation in the 
reservoirs (Frenette 1982). This rapid 
sedimentation interferes with the flow 
of water, reduces the holding capacity 
of the reservoir, and effects the effi- 
ciency of the dam. 
Today siltation in the reservoir has 
reduced the holding capacity of the 
Pkligre Dam by about 50 percent, and 
without dredging, repairs and erosion 
abatement strategies the full life of the 
dam will be reduced from the original 
estimate of 180 years to amere 80 years. 
In other words, the dam may be com- 
pletely silted up in 40 years. 
Since the construction of the Peligre 
hydroelectric and irrigation system, 
the percentage of Haitians living in 
urban centres has grown more than 
fivefold, from 6 percent to 33 percent of 
the total pbpulation. This change was 
partly the result of development-in- 
duced migration from the Artibonite 
District. The Peligre Dam increased the 
productivity and value of downstream 
land in the years following its con- 
struction. Anticipating the rise in 
value, Haitian elites snapped up many 
properties and leased them back to the 
many local farmers desperate to feed 
growing families. As communities be- 
low the dam grew, heirs were forced to 
split diminishing land resources, and 
the appearance of displaced people 
from the highlands placed a greater 
burden on local fuel, land and fresh- 
water resources. This pressure in- 
duced another wave of migration, 
mostly into the squatter settlements at 
the edge of Port-au-Prince. 
The government of Haiti now iden- 
tifies the Artibonite District as the area 
most urgently in need of land reform. 
The Artibonite has the largest number 
of properties held by absentee land- 
lords in the country, and since land 
productivity is diminishing, the com- 
petition for good land between mi- 
grants, renters and small-holders has 
grown violent. Other highland areas 
did not see as much investment in ag- 
ricultural development as the 
Artibonite, but still contributed large 
numbers of people to the growing 
coastal cities. 
Agricultural Development 
Projects in the Highlands 
Three key assumptions structured 
many of the agricultural development 
projects sponsored by foreign agen- 
cies, and these three assumptions were 
in part responsible for their long-term 
failure to generate sustainable agricul- 
ture. First, the superiority of Green- 
Revolution expertise and technology 
over that of indigenous farmers was 
assumed. Second, many planners as- 
sumed that Haitian farmers were 
highly independent producers who 
combated poverty by making only 
short-term investments in their land. 
Third, many planners worked around 
political territories rather than local 
ecology. Thus, foreign aid to agricul- 
ture often meant offering income-re- 
lated incentives to specific individuals, 
regardless of their location in the wa- 
tershed, to try techniques that would 
not be sustained once the funding 
stopped. 
The Green Revolution and 
Incentives 
Over two centuries ago Haitian peas- 
ants fought and won a revolution for 
independence from France and free- 
dom from slavery. Over the past half 
century Haitian peasants lost the fight 
for a Green Revolution that was to 
bring them economic prosperity and 
feed their growing numbers. 
The Haitian government tried to 
develop the country's industry at the 
expense of its agriculture even though 
the vast majority of the population 
were subsistence farmers in ruralhigh- 
lands. Small producers were heavily 
taxed though the state offered little 
agricultural or social assistance. Al- 
though significant financial support 
and technicalexpertise from the devel- 
oped world came to Haiti over the half 
century, the Green Revolution was 
largely unsuccessful. Many large agri- 
cultural development projects did not 
consider the fragdity of highland ecol- 
ogy, lowering the overall productivity 
of farms and driving people off the 
land. 
To encourage the Green Revolution, 
agencies offered subsidies and credits 
on the condition that farmers adopt the 
recommendations of experts on high- 
yield plant species, special tools and 
land-use techniques. This meant that 
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outside experts could effectively dic- 
tate the terms of agricultural produc- 
tion for large areas, and even if the 
expert knowledge contradicted indig- 
enous knowledge about local ecosys- 
tems, the farmers had an incentive to 
participate. In many cases the most la- 
bour-intensive techniques involved 
the construction of dams and bracing 
walls, and once the payment of wages 
and food stopped many of these struc- 
tures fell into disrepair. 
By the early 1980s new assumptions 
about peasant participation had to be 
worked into rural development 
projects. The new approaches recog- 
nized that farmer remuneration was 
not necessary for technique adoption 
and sometimes even acted against 
technique maintenance and diffusion; 
there existed a number of low-input, 
indigenous, anti-erosion techniques 
and agroforestry practices that could 
be improved; and peasants had a natu- 
ral incentive to conserve soil in order 
to increase agricultural production 
(White and Runge 1994,2). 
However, "development" was still 
an exercise of formalizing and 
commodifying reciprocal arrange- 
ments between farmers. A recent wa- 
tershed management project in 
southwest Haiti, discussed below, did 
not take advantage of the informal la- 
bour-reciprocity traditions of many 
rural Haitian farmers, and effectively 
strengthened the power of local elites 
and political bosses-the chefs de sec- 
tion. 
Haitian Peasants as "Free 
Riders" 
One of the crucial mistakes of many 
agricultural development strategies 
has been the assumption that Haitian 
peasants were "free riders" who chose 
to abuse common property, benefit 
from collective action without partici- 
pating, and invest only for short-term 
gain. In the early 1960s the human capi- 
tal of rural Haiti was studied by two 
major lending organizations: the OAS 
concluded that "no farmers' organiza- 
tion in the ordinary sense exists in 
Haiti" and the USAID concluded that 
the Haitian peasant was, "except un- 
der extreme duress, incapable of group 
action to defend his interests" (OAS 
1963; Schaedel1962, iii). A recent em- 
pirical study of collective action on 
watershed management exposed this 
myth (White and Runge 1994). Haitian 
communities do have strong traditions 
of cooperation, but old traditions of 
labour reciprocity were quickly 
eroded by development projects that 
demanded decisions from individual 
male heads of households and im- 
posed more formal economic practices 
over informal traditions. 
For example, White and Runge 
studied the cooperative habits of 
landholders within a watershed near 
Mdissade, in the central highlands of 
Haiti. Conventional wisdom predicted 
that collective management of the wa- 
tershed (1) would be of less interest to 
upstream farmers than downstream 
farmers; (2) would be of less interest to 
farmers who rented their land than 
those who owned their land; and (3) 
that a farmers' contribution to the ef- 
fort would only be in proportion to the 
expected benefits. 
However, the study found that there 
was no difference in the labour contrib- 
uted by those who benefited and those 
who did not, and that insecure land 
tenure did not affect a farmer's deci- 
sion to cooperate. A farmer's decision 
to participate in the watershed man- 
agement strategy was shaped by the 
individual's previous participation in 
small purchasing cooperatives (often 
calledpoupman), their understanding 
of the general benefits of soil conserva- 
tion, and their experience with small 
dam construction on their property. 
White and Runge (1994,29) conclude 
that free riding in the watershed man- 
agement institutions studied was not a 
dominant strategy, discrediting the 
assumption made by many policy in- 
terventions in Haitiof strong individu- 
alism among rural peasants. Even 
though individualism among rural 
farmers was not strong to begin with, 
by offering cash incentives to those 
who broke from traditional institu- 
tions, agencies actually created com- 
petitive individualism in many 
communities. 
Ecology and Territoriality 
Projects such as the Pkligre Dam were 
designed to serve populations within 
distinct political and administrative 
boundaries, with little or no recogni- 
tion of more natural ecological units 
over which such boundaries had been 
imposed. For example, different com- 
munities in the same watershed were 
affected by development in any one 
community if the shared watercourse 
was manipulated. Project Save the 
Land chose to work in a series of com- 
munities stretching along coastal 
roads that crossed eight watersheds. In 
the end the US$15 million project had 
a negative impact on the people it was 
meant to serve because it destroyed 
local institutions and left the popula- 
tion ill-equipped to deal with worsen- 
ing environmental degradation. 
People are still leaving the hillsides for 
Port-au-Prince and the southern 
coastal cities of Les Cayes and Jacmel. 
In 1985 the USAID began to fund a 
project called Save the Land through 
several small non-governmental or- 
ganizations (NGOs) with experience in 
Haiti. Its goals were to increase local 
income and reduce environmental 
degradation, and these goals would be 
accomplished by encouraging the pro- 
duction of high value crops, reforesta- 
tion, and soil conservation strategies 
(Jaffe, forthcoming). Ldcal storage fa- 
cilities would be improved, livestock 
health would be monitored, and farm- 
ers would be taught how to better 
market their products. The project in- 
cluded approximately 60,000 families 
across 80,000 hectares in eight water- 
sheds that flow down the southern 
exposure of the Massif de la Hotte 
mountain chain in the southwest arm 
of Haiti. 
Most of the families live in settle- 
ments along the coastal road, though 
the average density of the region was 
around 5.7 inhabitants for each hectare 
of arable land. Each farmer cultivated 
about 1.5 hectares over several differ- 
ent plots of land, some of which was 
rented. Land resources were un- 
equally distributed among the popula- 
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tion, with 10 percent of the population 
controlling 42 percent of the land. 
According to project designers, 
many farmers had contradictory 
arrangements with other farmers, si- 
multaneously renting out land to 
neighbours, renting land from neigh- 
bours, contracting labour to neigh- 
bours, and contracting labour from 
neighbours. The project sought to un- 
tangle these reciprocal arrangements 
and replace them with formal markets 
that could rationally mediate relation- 
ships with currency. 
Within the region, NGOs targeted 
only landowners, preferring to work 
on large properties where they could 
have a large impact. The local economy 
was rearranged for the temporary 
project as local staff demanded larger 
salaries, nonexistent workers applied 
for pay, export crops were encouraged 
over improved subsistence agri- 
culture, and farmers were asked to 
purchase high yield corn from institu- 
tional growers rather than use open- 
pollinated corn from previous seasons. 
More importantly, the existing tradi- 
tion of labour-reciprocity was super- 
seded by hierarchical management 
structures headed by individual com- 
munity representatives, usually local 
elites. 
Pressure from the USAID for em- 
pirical evidence of success drove NGO 
staff to concentrate directly on meas- 
urable, project-based improvements 
(hedgerows, check dams, and fertilizer 
use) to the neglect of improvements in 
the quality of life (democratic partici- 
pation, physical health or economic 
sustainability). Although traditional 
highland farming techniques were less 
than perfect, a recent study confirmed 
that the combination of indigenous 
knowledge with project-based soil 
conservation and agroforestry results 
in sigruficantly higher land productiv- 
ity than either practice alone (White 
and Jickling 1995). Project Save The 
Land had few lasting achievements. 
Many of the technical innovations 
brought to combat soil erosion and 
manage dwindling fuelwood sources 
were lost when the funding ended. 
Although traditions of labour reci- 
procity seemed convoluted at the out- 
set of the project, they had at least al- 
lowed disadvantaged families to 
participate in the local economy and 
farm at the subsistence level. In con- 
trast, project managers at the top of the 
administrative hierarchy rarely heard 
from disadvantaged families. "In the 
few instances that disapproval was 
received" writes one observer, "it was 
in the context of political unrest" (Jaffe, 
forthcoming). A growing number of 
impoverished farmers saw their yields 
decline, and since many could not sup- 
plement their income by working in 
rural areas, they were forced to give up 
land and migrate to the cities. 
Even with migration to the cities, the 
amount of land available to each 
farmer in Haiti has decreased substan- 
tially over the last three decades. Both 
the amount of cultivated land per per- 
son and per agricultural worker de- 
creased rapidly after 1970, even 
though the number of people involved 
in agriculture also decreased from 73 
percent to 65 percent of the total labour 
force. In 1970, each Haitian farmer had 
about 0.43 hectares of cultivable land, 
though today each farmer has less than 
0.35 hectares of cultivable land. Over- 
all, the amount of cultivable land has 
diminished from 0.32 hectares per per- 
son to less than 0.20 hectares per per- 
son today (World Resources Institute 
1994; World Bank 1997). Rapid popu- 
lation growth rates drove up the total 
number of people requiring land, for- 
est, water and the number of agricul- 
tural producers. Environmental 
degradation drove down the cultiva- 
ble amount of land and its productive 
capacity, inducing migration into Hai- 
ti's urban centres. 
Conclusion: Migration and 
Collective Grievances 
Mass migrations were not induced by 
every development project, and not all 
the people living in Haiti's slums are 
there only because of environmental 
degradation in the highlands. Political 
and economic factors also influenced 
the decision of individuals to leave 
rural areas. However, political ten- 
sions and economic conditions in 
many communities were the result of 
local environmental degradation, 
rapid population growth, and in-mi- 
gration from other communities. 
Population growth itself has been an 
important source of pressure in Haiti. 
In many Haitian communities, de- 
velopment-induced environmental 
degradation lowered the quality and 
quantity of forest, land and freshwater 
resources. This destroyed economic 
opportunities in rural agriculture and 
motivated the political demands for 
land reform and distributive justice, 
factors which are the most apparent 
cause of civil violence in Haiti. Severe 
environmental degradation, either as 
a direct consequence of large projects 
like the Peligre Dam or an indirect con- 
sequence of certain agrarian develop- 
ment strategies, induced a significant 
number of people to migrate into Hai- 
ti's urban centres. By destabilizing the 
ecology of rural areas where the popu- 
lation was growing rapidly, many 
families were unable to continue even 
subsistence farming. 
When migrants brought their griev- 
ances to the streets of Port-au-Prince 
and the neighbouring slum of Cite 
Soleil they often found people with 
similar grievances. Here the desperate 
sense of collective impoverishment 
was fuelled, and since the mid-1980s 
mob anger against Haitian elites has 
regularly threatened to consume the 
streets with chaos and violence. The 
surplus of urban labour has grown 
much more quickly than the formal 
economy, and since rapid migration 
into the slums of Port-au-Prince and the 
district capitals continues, the potential 
for more violent conflict grows. 
Notes 
1. Estimates for the current population of 
Port-au-Prince range between 1.8-2.5 
million, though the largest squatter set- 
tlement, Cite Soleil, has never been the 
subject of a comprehensive census. 
2. In 1955, engineers reported that in the area 
to benefit from irrigation "the average di- 
mension of worked land is 1.2 hectares." 
However, their report identifies 33,861 
parcels of land in 32,000 irrigable hectares, 
and the average dimension of worked 
land should probably have been calcu- 
lated at 1.06 hectares (Zamor 1983,30). 
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